US–EU Trade (2000–2025): A Comprehensive Report

The United States and the European Union maintain one of the world’s largest bilateral trade relationships. Over 2000–2025, transatlantic trade expanded significantly across goods and services, encompassing all major industry sectors. This period saw overall trade grow from roughly $400 billion in 2000 to nearly $1 trillion in goods trade by 2024 , alongside substantial services trade. Trade has generally trended upward, punctuated by notable disruptions (global financial crisis, COVID-19 pandemic) and policy shifts. Below, we delve into detailed data on trade balances, sector-specific patterns, value-added trade via supply chains, and the impact of tariffs and agreements on US–EU commerce.

Data Sources and Scope

This report draws on multiple datasets and official sources to capture US–EU trade from 2000 through 2025. Goods trade values (exports, imports, balances) are sourced from U.S. Census Bureau data for U.S. trade with the EU and Eurostat statistics for EU trade with the US . Services trade figures come from EU and U.S. reports . Industry-level insights (e.g. machinery, chemicals, agriculture) are based on trade classifications (SITC and NAICS) reported by Eurostat and U.S. agencies. Additionally, OECD inter-country input–output data and research on trade in value added inform the analysis of supply chain integration. All values are nominal and, unless noted, refer to annual totals. (Note: The EU is treated as the aggregate of member states; the EU had 15 members in 2000 and 27 as of 2020, but aggregated totals are used consistently for trend analysis.)

Overall Trade Trends (2000–2025)

Major Phases

Trade grew robustly in the early 2000s, then plateaued and dipped in 2009 amid the global financial crisis. U.S.–EU goods trade peaked around $640 billion in 2008 before contracting by ~20% in 2009 (U.S. exports to EU fell from $272 billion to $221 billion). This reflected the recession’s impact on transatlantic demand. The 2010s saw a steady recovery and expansion: by 2011, trade had rebounded to pre-crisis levels, and it continued rising through the decade. From 2010 to 2019, U.S. goods exports to the EU grew ~41% while imports from the EU grew ~61%, widening the trade gap. Growth was driven by increased exchange of manufactured goods as both economies recovered and firms globalized supply chains.

Trade Troughs & Surges

The COVID-19 pandemic caused a sharp drop in 2020 – U.S. exports to Europe plummeted over 30% that year as travel and demand for capital goods collapsed, whereas imports from Europe fell ~19%. Transatlantic trade bottomed out in mid-2020 but rebounded strongly in 2021–2022 with the global recovery. By 2022, goods trade reached a new high; EU data show 2022 was a peak year for both EU exports and imports with the U.S. . One factor was energy: after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe pivoted to U.S. suppliers for oil and gas, boosting U.S. exports . By 2024, goods trade approached the $1 trillion mark, the highest on record . Meanwhile, services trade also grew substantially. In 2023, bilateral services trade totaled about €746 billion (≈$800 billion), split between €319 billion in EU exports of services to the US and €427 billion in imports from the US. Including both goods and services, annual US–EU trade exceeded €1.6 trillion in 2023 – roughly €4.4 billion crossing the Atlantic each day.

Trade Balances & Imbalances

Overall Balance

The U.S. has persistently run a goods trade deficit with Europe, while enjoying a services trade surplus. In 2000, the U.S. goods trade deficit with the EU was about $59 billion. This gap widened nearly four-fold by 2024, reaching a U.S. deficit of $236 billion . The increasing deficit was gradual but sustained, especially in the 2010s: for example, the deficit grew from ~$99 billion in 2011 to ~$178 billion by 2019. Key drivers were rising U.S. imports of European pharmaceuticals, machinery, and vehicles outpacing U.S. export growth. A strong dollar in mid-2010s made EU goods relatively cheaper, contributing to import growth. The deficit temporarily narrowed in recession years (e.g. 2009, 2020) when U.S. imports fell faster than exports, but it quickly expanded again with economic recovery. By 2023–2024, U.S. goods trade deficits with the EU hit record levels annually.

However, in services, the balance tilts the other way. The EU ran a €109 billion services trade deficit with the U.S. in 2023 (EU imported more U.S. services). U.S. firms excel in services like finance, tech, intellectual property and business services, leading to U.S. surpluses that partially offset the goods deficit. Indeed, when goods and services are combined, transatlantic trade is much closer to balanced – the difference between EU exports and imports in total trade was only about 3% of the total in 2023. In other words, Europe’s large surplus in manufactured goods is largely offset by America’s surplus in services (and certain agricultural and energy products), yielding a more even overall economic exchange.

EU Perspective

From the EU standpoint, the United States is its top export market and a major source of imports. The EU consistently runs a surplus in goods trade with the U.S. (e.g. €157 billion surplus in 2023) and a deficit in services (e.g. –€109 billion in 2023). The “cover ratio” – exports as a percent of imports – illustrates this: EU exports to the U.S. have often been 60–68% of what it imports from the U.S. (in value). This ratio dipped in 2020 when EU exports fell sharply (cover ratio only ~59% that year, reflecting a smaller surplus), but rebounded as trade normalized. By 2024 the U.S. accounted for about 20.6% of EU’s extra-EU goods exports (making it the EU’s #1 export partner) and 13.7% of its imports. In sum, Europe’s surplus in transatlantic goods trade has become a significant feature, while the United States’ strength in services trade balances the ledger to a large extent when all trade is considered.

Industry-Specific Trade Patterns

Manufactured Goods – Machinery, Vehicles, & Equipment

This is the largest category of US–EU merchandise trade. In 2024, about 91% of EU exports to the U.S. were manufactured goods , especially machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals. EU exports of “Machinery & vehicles” (which includes cars, aircraft, industrial machinery, etc.) comprised roughly 39% of EU’s exports to the U.S., and “Chemicals” (including pharmaceuticals) another 32%. The U.S., for its part, also exports significant machinery and equipment to Europe, but in smaller volumes. For example, U.S. exports of advanced manufacturing goods like aerospace products, machinery, and electronics have grown since 2000 – the U.S. shipped an estimated $35 billion in aerospace equipment to the EU in 2015 and continues to export a large number of aircraft, engines, and parts to Europe. Automotive trade is a notable subset: Europe exports many finished cars to the U.S. (Germany and others sending high-end vehicles), whereas the U.S. exports fewer cars to Europe. This contributed to a persistent U.S. automotive trade deficit. By 2024, the EU had a €102 billion surplus in machinery/vehicles with the U.S., underscoring Europe’s strength in this sector.

Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals

This is another heavyweight sector in bilateral trade. The EU exports a large value of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and specialty materials to the U.S., while the U.S. also exports substantial pharmaceuticals and chemicals to Europe. In fact, medical and pharmaceutical products have been among Europe’s top exports to the U.S. in recent years, and also one of the top U.S. exports to Europe. The EU enjoys a surplus in chemicals overall (€92 billion in 2024) , reflecting the presence of major European drug and chemical companies exporting to the U.S. (many based in Ireland, Germany, etc.). Notably, tariffs on pharmaceuticals are zero under the WTO Pharma Agreement, facilitating large two-way trade. Both sides are interdependent in this industry’s supply chain: for example, the EU is a key supplier of medicinal ingredients and pharmaceutical products to the U.S. (ensuring U.S. healthcare supply), while the U.S. supplies Europe with certain patented medicines and chemical feedstocks. Overall chemical trade grew strongly post-2000, especially as pharma supply chains globalized.

Automotive & Transportation Equipment

Europe’s automotive sector (cars and parts) consistently runs a trade surplus with the U.S. The U.S. imports tens of billions of dollars’ worth of European cars annually (BMW, VW, Mercedes, etc.), whereas U.S. vehicle exports to Europe are modest. This imbalance has been politically sensitive (the U.S. has low car tariffs ~2.5% vs EU’s 10% car tariff). Although the U.S. considered new auto tariffs in 2018–2019, they were not imposed. Beyond cars, aerospace is significant: Boeing and Airbus dominate the airplane market and each sells to airlines on both sides. U.S. exports of aircraft to the EU (Boeing jets, often with GE engines) and EU exports of aircraft to the U.S. (Airbus jets, often with Rolls-Royce engines) are both large. These flows were subject to the Boeing–Airbus subsidies dispute (discussed later) which saw tariffs on planes in 2019–2020. By value, aerospace trade is one of the top U.S. exports to Europe (dozens of jets annually) and also a top EU export to the U.S. after 2018 when Airbus gained U.S. market share. This sector exemplifies the supply-chain integration – many parts used by Boeing and Airbus come from each other’s markets (French-made Airbus parts in Boeing aircraft and vice versa), blurring the lines of bilateral trade balances in this category.

Energy & Raw Materials

Historically, energy was a small part of US–EU trade (the U.S. was a net importer of oil/gas, and the EU mostly bought energy from Russia, OPEC, etc.). This changed dramatically in the 2010s. With the U.S. shale revolution, the U.S. became a major exporter of oil and natural gas. The EU in turn became a growing market for U.S. energy. By the early 2020s, the European Union was the largest buyer of U.S. natural gas and oil . In particular, U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Europe surged from 2016 onward (after the U.S. began LNG exports) and spiked after 2022 when Europe cut back Russian gas. Petroleum and coal products became one of the fastest-growing U.S. export categories to the EU in 2021–2022 . EU imports of U.S. petroleum oils jumped so much that in 2024 “petroleum oils” became the single largest import item from the U.S. in EU statistics. Consequently, the EU runs a trade deficit in energy with the U.S. (about €65 billion deficit in 2024) , a reversal from two decades ago. On the flip side, the EU exports relatively little energy to the U.S. (some refined fuels, but negligible compared to U.S. output). Raw materials & agriculture: The U.S. also exports raw materials (like minerals, forest products) and agricultural goods to Europe, while the EU exports high-value foods and beverages (wine, spirits, specialty foods). The EU typically has a surplus in food and drink trade (about €18 billion in 2024) thanks to exports of European wine, cheese, etc., but runs a deficit in raw materials (–€4 billion) since it imports U.S. soybeans, animal feed, and other farm commodities. Notably, after 2018 the EU imported more U.S. soy (when China’s tariffs on U.S. soy led to diversion), and the EU temporarily became the top destination for U.S. soybeans.

Services & Digital Trade

Both the U.S. and EU are services-driven economies, and bilateral services trade grew markedly after 2000 (more than doubling by 2025). Key service sectors include finance, insurance, business services, royalties/licensing, information technology and telecom, transportation, and travel. The U.S. consistently exports more services to the EU than it imports. For example, U.S. companies provide significant financial and IT services in Europe, and earn royalties from intellectual property (technology, entertainment) used in Europe – contributing to a U.S. surplus in services. Meanwhile, millions of EU tourists visit the U.S. and vice versa, and companies on both sides outsource business services to each other. By 2023 U.S.–EU services trade was roughly balanced in total value (as noted, ~€746 billion two-way) , but the composition differs: the EU’s largest services export to the U.S. is travel (European tourists and spending in the U.S.), whereas the U.S.’s largest services exports to the EU include intellectual property (e.g. software, entertainment), financial services, and tech services . The digital economy grew rapidly in this period, with U.S. tech firms (Google, Microsoft, etc.) exporting services and Europe providing strong industrial engineering services. Regulations like the EU’s GDPR (privacy law) in 2018 affected digital trade flows, requiring data localization or compliance costs for U.S. tech companies, but overall digital trade continued expanding.

Supply Chains & Value-Added Trade

High Intra-Industry Trade

The U.S. and EU often trade similar categories of goods – e.g. exchanging different types of machinery, vehicles, or chemicals. This indicates intra-industry trade, where each side specializes in different niches (German luxury cars for American market, U.S. specialized machinery for European factories, etc.). It’s common for manufactured products to cross the Atlantic multiple times at different production stages.

Intra-Firm Trade

A significant share of U.S.–EU trade occurs within the same companies operating on both sides. Major corporations have transatlantic subsidiaries that ship components and products to each other. For example, an American pharmaceutical firm might ship active ingredients to its European affiliate, or a European carmaker sends engines to its U.S. plant. In 2021, about 65% of U.S. goods imports from the EU were intra-firm trade (shipments between affiliated companies), far above the global average. Similarly, around 39% of U.S. exports to Europe were intra-company shipments . These high shares underscore tightly knit supply chains. (Notably, intra-firm import shares were extremely high for certain countries – e.g. 85% of U.S. imports from Ireland and 68% from Germany were intra-firm, reflecting pharmaceutical and automotive supply chains, respectively.)

Global Value Chains (GVCs): Input-output models and Trade in Value Added (TiVA) data reveal that many exports contain a portion of value from other countries. For large advanced economies like the U.S. and EU, most of the value in exports is domestic, but a considerable fraction is foreign inputs. For instance, a German car exported to the U.S. might include electronics from Asia; a U.S. jet exported to Europe might include parts from Canada or the UK. OECD’s TiVA database shows that European countries are about 50% more exposed to U.S. demand in value-added terms than in gross trade terms . This means when one accounts for where inputs ultimately come from and go to, Europe’s true reliance on U.S. final demand is greater – many European intermediate goods are embedded in final products sold to the U.S. As a result, a U.S. tariff on European final goods can ripple through European supply chains more than gross export numbers suggest. Conversely, some U.S. exports to Europe incorporate parts made in Asia or North America, diluting the domestic value. Still, the majority of transatlantic trade (on the order of 85% or more) is domestic value-added from the exporter, since both produce high-value components internally.

Jobs and Investment Links

The deep supply chain integration is also seen in investment and employment. Millions of jobs on each side depend on transatlantic trade and investment. EU officials note that “millions of jobs in the United States are related to EU–US trade and investment” and similarly for EU jobs tied to U.S. firms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has built supply networks – by 2022, companies had $5.3 trillion in mutual U.S.–EU investment stock, enabling local production and cross-supply. In fact, the affiliate sales of U.S. firms in Europe and EU firms in the U.S. ($6.9 trillion in 2022) far exceed trade values. This means companies often serve the foreign market by producing locally (hence “trade” via sales of affiliates), but they still trade components and high-end goods across the ocean as part of integrated production networks.

Supply Chain Events

The period saw some notable supply-chain disruptions and realignments. The 2011 Japanese tsunami and 2010s global supply shifts didn’t spare U.S.–EU trade but had limited direct impact given diversification. The 2020 pandemic, however, exposed supply chain vulnerabilities – e.g. initial shortages in medical supplies spurred transatlantic cooperation to ensure flow of critical goods. In 2021–2022, global logistics snarls and semiconductor shortages affected industries like automotive on both sides, leading to policy talks on supply chain resilience. The U.S. and EU launched initiatives (e.g. the Trade and Technology Council’s Supply Chain working group) to coordinate on securing supply chains for chips, critical minerals, and energy.

In summary, U.S.–EU trade is not a simple buyer-seller relationship but rather a complex web of co-production. Many American products have “made in EU” inputs and vice versa, tying their economic fortunes together. This high integration means that trade policies or shocks can have widespread effects beyond just bilateral trade values.

Tariffs, Trade Policy, & Agreements (2000–2025)

Low Average Tariffs

Both the U.S. and EU are part of the WTO and have relatively low Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs. The EU’s average external tariff is about 3% (trade-weighted), and the U.S. average is similarly low (in the 2–3% range). Many industrial goods flow with zero or minimal duties – for example, pharmaceuticals, civil aircraft, and ICT products are duty-free under WTO agreements that both parties implement. This means that non-tariff measures (standards, regulations) often have more impact on trade than tariffs. Recognizing this, in 2013 the U.S. and EU launched negotiations for an ambitious free trade deal, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP aimed to slash remaining tariffs and especially to harmonize regulations/standards to facilitate trade. TTIP negotiations were launched in 2013 but ended in 2016 without conclusion, and were formally closed in 2019 . Political hurdles, public concerns (over agriculture, regulatory sovereignty), and changes in U.S. leadership led to its demise, so no comprehensive FTA emerged. Thus, throughout 2000–2025, transatlantic trade was conducted mostly under WTO rules, with some sector-specific agreements.

Tariff Spats & Wars

Steel and Aluminum (2002 and 2018)

In 2002, the U.S. (under President Bush) imposed temporary tariffs of up to 30% on steel imports, including from the EU, citing injury to domestic steel. The EU threatened retaliation (targeting products like oranges and textiles) and challenged the move at the WTO. Ultimately, the U.S. lifted these steel tariffs by late 2003, averting a trade war. A more significant clash occurred in 2018, when the U.S. (under President Trump) invoked national security (Section 232) to impose 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminum imports globally, which hit European metals exports. The EU responded firmly – it imposed retaliatory tariffs of 10–25% on about $1.3 billion worth of U.S. exports (using 2020 trade values). These counter-tariffs targeted iconic American products (motorcycles like Harley-Davidson, bourbon whiskey, Levi’s jeans, etc.) both for political impact and symbolic effect. The transatlantic rift escalated, but by 2021 a truce was reached: the U.S. and EU negotiated a pause – the U.S. converted the steel/aluminum tariffs for the EU into a quota-based system (allowing a certain volume duty-free) and the EU suspended its retaliation. They also began talks toward a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum” to address overcapacity and unfair practices, aiming to resolve the issue long-term. (As of early 2025, those talks continue; the EU has warned of potential re-imposition of tariffs if no agreement is reached.)

Boeing–Airbus Aircraft Subsidy Dispute

This was the largest and longest-running trade dispute between U.S. and EU. Both accused each other of illegal government subsidies to Boeing (U.S.) and Airbus (EU). After years of WTO litigation, in October 2019 the WTO authorized the U.S. to impose tariffs on $7.5 billion of EU imports – the largest arbitration award in WTO history . The U.S. levied tariffs of 15% on Airbus aircraft and 25% on a range of non-aircraft EU goods (like cheeses, wines, olives, and machinery) starting in late 2019 . In a reciprocal case, the WTO in 2020 allowed the EU to hit $4 billion of U.S. goods with tariffs; the EU proceeded to impose its own 15–25% duties (on products like tractors, ketchup, orange juice, and planes) in late 2020. These tit-for-tat measures strained sectors on both sides – for instance, U.S. whiskey and cheese exporters lost EU sales, and EU luxury goods faced U.S. import taxes. Fortunately, with a change in U.S. administration, a resolution came: In June 2021, the U.S. and EU agreed to suspend the aircraft dispute tariffs for five years and work together to address aircraft subsidies outside the WTO . This truce effectively ended the 17-year Boeing-Airbus trade war, at least temporarily, and removed the retaliatory tariffs, much to the relief of affected industries.

Other Tariff Issues

The U.S. and EU had a range of smaller-scale tariff disagreements. The U.S. long complained about the EU’s high tariffs on certain agricultural products and trucks, while the EU objected to U.S. tariffs on light trucks (25% “chicken tax”) and some Buy American provisions. There were also retaliatory tariffs related to a digital services tax dispute (the U.S. threatened tariffs against countries including EU members for taxing U.S. tech companies, but these were paused pending an OECD tax deal). Another skirmish was over U.S. tariffs on Spanish olives (on anti-dumping grounds), which the EU challenged at the WTO. Broadly, such issues remained limited in scope relative to the massive scale of tariff-free trade that continued daily.

Regulatory Changes & Non-Tariff Barriers

Standards and Safety

The EU and U.S. often have different standards for products (e.g. auto safety, chemical use, food safety). For example, the EU bans certain American farm products (hormone-treated beef, GMOs, chlorine-washed chicken) for health reasons, which the U.S. views as non-tariff barriers. This limited U.S. agricultural exports and was a sticking point in TTIP. Conversely, U.S. regulators differ on some automobile and pharmaceutical standards, complicating EU exports. Although TTIP failed, sectoral cooperation made progress – e.g. mutual recognition agreements in areas like pharmaceuticals good manufacturing practice and a 2018 pact on safety standards for certain products. These efforts aimed to reduce costly duplication.

Trade Facilitation

Both sides worked to streamline customs procedures and harmonize regulations through forums like the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in late 2000s and later the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) launched in 2021 . The TTC created working groups on tech standards, export controls, screening of investments, and global trade challenges (like addressing China’s practices).

Brexit 

The UK’s exit from the EU in 2020 indirectly affected US–EU trade. The UK was a major part of EU–US trade flows (e.g. U.S.–UK trade now no longer counted in EU totals post-2020). The EU’s trade data “EU27” excludes the UK from 2020 onward, so trends are adjusted accordingly. The U.S. started separate trade talks with the UK, but as of 2025 no FTA is concluded. US–EU trade continues with EU27, and the overall volumes did not drastically change as the UK’s trade with the U.S. was relatively small in the EU total (UK accounted for a portion now handled separately).

Emerging Policy Areas

In the 2020s, climate and security policies began shaping trade. The EU’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – a carbon tariff on carbon-intensive imports (like steel, cement) – could affect U.S. exporters when it fully starts later in the decade. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (2022), with subsidies for electric vehicles and batteries, raised EU concerns about discrimination against EU products; in response, the U.S. and EU opened talks on a critical minerals agreement to allow EU-sourced materials to qualify for U.S. EV credits. These developments show trade policy expanding beyond tariffs to include climate and supply-chain security considerations.

Major Agreements & Initiatives

Despite the lack of a trade deal like TTIP, the U.S. and EU did implement some targeted agreements: In 2019, they agreed to eliminate tariffs on a small set of products (e.g. the EU removed tariffs on U.S. lobsters, and the U.S. reduced tariffs on certain European glassware and prepared meals) – the first tariff cuts in decades, though very limited in scope. The Open Skies Agreement (2007) liberalized EU–US air travel markets, boosting services trade in aviation. Ongoing cooperation in WTO and other forums: Together, the U.S. and EU were pivotal in the early 2000s Doha Round negotiations (though that round stalled). In recent years, they have coordinated on WTO reform proposals, e-commerce trade rules, and joint approaches to combat unfair trade (e.g. steel overcapacity largely attributed to China). Both also joined the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) talks and negotiated the ITA expansion (Information Technology Agreement) in 2015 to cut tariffs on high-tech goods. The Privacy Shield agreement (2016) (and its predecessor Safe Harbor) addressed rules for EU–US data flows, which, while not a goods trade matter, is critical for digital services trade. Though struck down by EU courts, a new Data Privacy Framework in 2023 aimed to restore legal data transfers, smoothing the way for cloud and tech services trade.

In summary, trade policies from 2000–2025 oscillated between cooperation and conflict. Both sides mostly maintained open markets, but politically sensitive sectors (steel, agriculture, aircraft, etc.) led to periodic tariff fights. Yet, these were eventually resolved or managed, preventing broader disruption. The failure of TTIP was a setback for deep integration, but the creation of forums like the Trade & Technology Council indicates a continued commitment to aligning standards and addressing new trade challenges jointly . Going into 2025, US–EU trade policy emphasizes cooperation on strategic supply chains (semiconductors, critical minerals), dealing with non-market economies, and balancing competition with partnership in green technologies.

Year-by-Year Highlights & Economic Influences

• Early 2000s: Transatlantic trade expands as the euro is introduced (1999) providing currency stability in Europe. A mild U.S. recession in 2001 slows trade briefly. China’s 2001 WTO entry begins altering global trade flows, but US–EU trade grows steadily. In 2002, the U.S. steel tariff episode strains relations, but is resolved by 2003. By 2004, the EU’s enlargement (adding 10 new members) broadens the base for EU–US trade. EU countries like Poland and Hungary see fast export growth to the U.S. as they integrate into EU supply chains.

• Mid-2000s: Trade continues rising; 2006–2007 sees booming transatlantic commerce amid global growth. The U.S. imports more luxury goods and capital equipment from Europe, and EU imports of U.S. services and tech rise. The 2008 financial crisis (originating in the U.S. then hitting Europe) causes a sharp contraction in 2009 . Transatlantic trade volumes drop ~20% as demand plummets.

• 2010–2013: Recovery is underway; 2011 marks a return to pre-crisis trade levels . The U.S. Federal Reserve’s QE and a weaker dollar initially help U.S. exports. But the Eurozone debt crisis (2010–2012) leads to economic stress in Europe, slowing EU demand for imports. Nonetheless, by 2013, EU–US trade is growing again. 2013 is notable as the year EU’s cover ratio (exports/imports) with the U.S. peaked at ~68% , meaning EU exports were relatively very strong. The launch of TTIP talks in 2013 reflects optimism about deepening ties.

• 2014–2016: Transatlantic trade plateaus somewhat. A strong U.S. dollar (2014–2015) makes imports from Europe cheaper, contributing to record EU–US goods trade (~$700B+ annually) but also a rising U.S. deficit . The EU’s exports were competitive, while U.S. exports were hampered by the strong dollar and slower EU growth. TTIP negotiations falter and ultimately halt by end-2016 amid public protests in Europe (concerns over agriculture and investment arbitration). In 2016, the UK’s Brexit vote creates uncertainty for trade, though no immediate change yet.

• 2017–2019: A period of tension and volatility. The new U.S. administration takes a unilateral trade stance. In 2018, the steel/aluminum tariffs hit EU exporters and prompt retaliation . Threats of auto tariffs loom in 2018–2019, causing European carmakers to shudder, though these tariffs are shelved. Despite tensions, trade in goods reaches new highs: by 2019 goods trade is $852 billion, with the U.S. deficit at a then-high of $178 billion . Services and digital trade also flourish (Big Tech’s presence in Europe grows, as do EU fintech and engineering services in the U.S.). Late 2019 sees the Airbus/Boeing tariffs come into force, slightly dampening specific categories (e.g. luxury foods, aircraft sales) but overall trade remains robust going into 2020.

• 2020: The COVID-19 pandemic causes an unprecedented drop in transatlantic trade. Travel bans and lockdowns slash services trade (tourism nearly zero for months). Goods trade also falls sharply in Q2 2020 – U.S. exports to the EU in May 2020 were just $15.5B (vs $27B Jan 2020) . Sectors like aerospace and automotive see collapse in demand. By year’s end, goods trade is down ~15% overall, back to levels from a decade prior . Supply chain disruptions lead to export controls on medical supplies initially, but the U.S. and EU cooperate to ensure flow of critical goods (e.g. EU ships medical gear to U.S.; U.S. pharmaceutical and vaccine supply chains involve EU inputs). The EU’s trade surplus dips as its exports fall more steeply in certain months .

• 2021–2022: Strong recovery – trade bounces back with ~18%+ growth. In 2021, U.S. imports of EU goods surge (fueled by stimulus-driven demand), and by 2022 U.S. exports to EU surge as well (fueled by Europe’s energy needs and restocking) . The Boeing-Airbus truce in 2021 removes a drag on trade . Additionally, the U.S.–EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is inaugurated in mid-2021 , improving dialogue on trade tech issues. In 2022, Russia’s war in Ukraine dramatically alters trade flows: the EU cuts Russian imports and U.S.–EU energy trade skyrockets, contributing to record trade values. By 2022, EU imports from the U.S. hit their highest ever (e.g. €145 billion) and EU exports to U.S. also hit a record (e.g. €131 billion) . The EU’s trade surplus with the U.S. actually shrinks slightly in 2022 as it buys more energy. Both economies also face inflation in 2022, but trade in nominal terms is buoyed by higher prices (especially energy).

• 2023–2025: In 2023, transatlantic trade remains extremely high, though growth moderates. Europe’s economy slows in 2023 (energy price shock), tempering import growth; U.S. demand for European goods stays strong, widening the U.S. deficit to over $208 billion in 2023 . By 2024, U.S. goods imports from Europe jump another ~5%, hitting $606 billion , while U.S. exports plateau, pushing the deficit to a new record of $235.6 billion . Both sides continue to deepen cooperation: they coordinate on sanctioning Russia (further integrating their strategic trade), and jointly address issues like semiconductor shortages. Trade officials focus on new agreements (e.g. a possible Critical Minerals Agreement for EV battery materials) and resolving the remaining steel tariff issue. Regulatory changes like the EU’s CBAM start in a transitional phase in 2023, signaling future shifts in trade costs for carbon-intensive goods. By 2025, the outlook is that US–EU trade will remain a cornerstone of the global economy, with relatively balanced overall exchange once services are included, and with increasing emphasis on resilient supply chains, technological cooperation, and sustainable trade as key themes.

Conclusion

From 2000 to 2025, U.S.–EU trade has grown into an interdependent, trillion-dollar relationship that underpins millions of jobs and a large share of global economic output. The data shows expanding trade across almost all sectors – from cars and computers to chemicals and consulting services. Trade balances shifted toward a larger European surplus in goods, offset by a U.S. surplus in services, reflecting each side’s competitive strengths. The intricate supply chains mean that rather than simple competition, the U.S. and EU often co-create value, supplying each other with parts, technologies, and investments.

Economic and political events tested this partnership – wars, recessions, pandemics, and policy disputes all left their mark – but the overall trend has been resilience and deeper integration. Even contentious episodes like tariff wars were eventually resolved through negotiation, highlighting the importance of the transatlantic alliance. By 2025, with new challenges such as digital trade rules, climate policies, and great-power competition arising, the U.S. and EU are leveraging their longstanding trade ties to cooperate more closely. Initiatives like the Trade and Technology Council and joint approaches to critical supply chains indicate that beyond raw trade numbers, the strategic dimension of US–EU trade is growing. In essence, the 2000–2025 period solidified the Transatlantic economy as a backbone of global trade, characterized by comprehensive industry engagement, significant value-added exchange, and a gradual evolution from tariff-centric issues to a broader focus on standards and sustainability in trade.

Sources: Official U.S. trade data (U.S. Census Bureau); Eurostat trade statistics; European Commission reports; OECD and IMF analyses on value-added trade; Congressional Research Service and USTR reports on trade measures; various years 2000–2025.